

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

WASHINGTON TIMES
16 May 1984

Schlesinger chides hesitant foreign policy

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, in an interview with The Washington Times, has criticized the Reagan administration for insufficient application of power in Lebanon and for not seeking adequate resources in Central America.

Mr. Schlesinger, also a former head of the CIA and Atomic Energy Commission, added that it will take more than an occasional speech by President Reagan to create a national consensus toward his Central American policies.

In an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, a member of The Washington Times editorial board, Mr. Schlesinger noted democracies face a difficult predicament when they attempt to defeat communist insurrections and "the Soviets are very skillful in all aspects of indirect warfare." A question-and-answer version of the interview appeared in The Times yesterday.

Mr. Schlesinger observed there have been hostile intelligence efforts in the United States in recent years and suggested that the establishment of the "extremist background of people is pertinent information."

"If we clearly underscore the fact that many of these groups — not individuals — are supported by this nation's enemies, I do not think they would have the success they have enjoyed while indulging the pretense they are merely expressing a different and unorthodox viewpoint."

The acceptance of a limit of a small number of military advisers is a "wavering signal" from an administration that suggests Central America ranks in geopolitical importance with Western Europe and the Persian Gulf, he said. "One has to be badly misinformed or dishonest not to recognize the insurrection in El Salvador, the dramatic growth of Cuban proxy military power in Nicaragua and Soviet proxy power in Cuba are the underlying causes for the militarization of the region.

"President Reagan refrained from requesting what was needed to do the job. . . . Indeed the sums that have been requested have been quite small and they are clearly inadequate for providing the support necessary for friendly regimes to achieve their military goals."

He added, "If one really believes the

loss of the Central American isthmus would be comparable to the loss of Western Europe [where 300,000 U.S. troops are stationed], then one cannot say that under no circumstances would we send forces to save the situation.

"Indeed, we should be prepared to send forces. We have pledged to intervene in the Persian Gulf under two presidents. That is tangible evidence of the degree of importance we attach to the area.

"In Central America the uncertain trumpet says, 'All important, yes, but not important enough to ever send troops there.' In geopolitical terms, our adversaries have to assume we place a lower priority on Central America than on Western Europe."

Mr. Schlesinger added, "Today we are relatively weaker vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. Therefore, we should be doubly careful not to get ourselves into a situation in which we are likely to be unsuccessful.

"Lebanon was a classic example. Token deployment against massive resistance provided leverage for opponents and very little for ourselves. It was bound to prove an embarrassment."

— Alan McConagha

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3CWASHINGTON TIMES
15 May 1984

Q&A: Schlesinger warns on uncertain foreign policy trumpet

James R. Schlesinger on where we stand.

James R. Schlesinger, 54, served as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and secretary of defense between 1971 and 1975. His government career began in 1969, with his last assignment as the first secretary of energy under President Carter, a post he held for two years, until 1979.

Presidential hopeful Walter Mondale has asked Mr. Schlesinger for his endorsement, a request that was denied until Mr. Schlesinger is satisfied that his foreign policy views coincide roughly with Mr. Mondale's.

Mr. Schlesinger divides his time between Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he is senior adviser, and the investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc., where he also serves as senior adviser. Arnaud de Borchgrave, a member of The Washington Times editorial board, interviewed Mr. Schlesinger and concluded there is little common foreign policy ground between the former vice president and the former secretary of defense.

* * * * *

Q: Something that is organized in our own country by hostile intelligence operations is then part of the free flow of ideas in a democracy?

A: Provided that the source of the information is clearly labeled so that disinformation becomes recognizable. Those conveying views hostile to our society need not be given the kind of access that we have been giving these people in recent years. But I can see this is not the case. The historic basis of our society is one that was put by John Milton in "Areopagitica" (1644) — "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties." Part of the problem here is the belief that men and women operate as individuals in accordance with conscience. It may be that when one is facing an organized disinformation effort of the sort that we have seen in recent years, that fundamental tenet of our democracy is a misplaced faith. I know this sounds a little bit unfashionable these days but the extremist background of people is pertinent information. The new generation's view is that we should disregard such things and examine only the viewpoints expressed. I think this is funda-

mentally wrong. One of the instruments one has in assessing views that are presented is the intellectual background of those who advocate them. If we clearly underscore the fact that many of these groups — not individuals — are supported by this nation's enemies, I do not think they would have the success they have enjoyed while indulging the pretense they are merely expressing a different and unorthodox viewpoint.

Q: The problem is that these organizations manipulate people on the Hill and in the liberal media without those concerned realizing that the master manipulators behind the scenes are this country's enemies. It's a very subtle process.

A: I agree and I would not deny the vulnerability that we have developed. The great defense of democracies is that they will be able to achieve consensus and then they can simply throw off these attempts at penetration and subversion.

Q: What do you make over the outburst of outrage over the mining of Nicaraguan ports? Senators even felt compelled to lie about their alleged lack of information about these mines that were not even designed to sink ships but to damage them and scare them off.

A: This was an operation of dubious advantage to the United States. It should have been examined more carefully in advance and if it had been decided to proceed in this manner, then every effort should have been made to convey the gist of it to the intelligence committees.

Q: When a former European intelligence chief was asked by a group of senators how he viewed the United States from his vantage point, he replied, "like a giant with feet of clay." What can be done to change that perception?

A: The European view is true — and overdue. We need a few successes to change it. It's impossible for any society to live up to the degree of admiration the Europeans had for the United States after World War II. We were the liberator and also the creator of a new German society. No nation could sustain that. So some of the disenchantment was inevitable. We have stumbled in recent years and it's high time we stopped stumbling. The United States, when it gathers itself together, is capable of extraordinary acts. We are no more doomed to a period of weakness

Continued

than we were destined to sustain the strength that we had in the postwar period.

During the October '73 war, when the United States initiated the resupply airlift to Israel, most of our allies opposed us — were quite hostile, in fact. Nevertheless, when the air bridge was established and we sustained Israeli military forces 5,000 miles away under very difficult conditions, European reaction was "we don't agree, but they're darn good when they set their minds to an objective." You would be astonished at how quickly the climate of respect for the United States could be recreated as a result of a few successes.

Today we are relatively weaker vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. Therefore, we should be doubly careful not to get ourselves into a situation in which we are likely to be unsuccessful. Lebanon was a classic example. Token deployment against massive resistance provided leverage for opponents and very little for ourselves. It was bound to prove an embarrassment.

* * * * *

EXCEPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-2

WASHINGTON POST
15 February 1984

MIKE CAUSEY

THE FEDERAL DIARY

Paintings Not Part of Money-Saving Picture

The Department of Energy, which plans to save money by eliminating 700 jobs over the next fiscal year, has approved an \$11,250 contract for a New York artist to paint a 4-by-5-foot portrait of Secretary Donald P. Hodel.

Energy has budgeted \$10,000 for the painting. There is another \$450 in the contract to pay for the artist to visit Hodel and see what he looks like, and another \$800 to frame the work.

When the paint is dry, Hodel's portrait will hang beside those of other Energy Department chiefs, including the Department's first secretary, James R. Schlesinger.

Schlesinger's portrait also hangs in the Pentagon (he was Defense secretary from 1973 to 1975), and he may even rate one at the CIA building, where he was once the director of central intelligence.

The Department of Energy, of course, is not the only department that has hired—or will hire—somebody to capture the likeness of the boss on canvas.

Most departments have commissioned artists to paint the bosses, because all cabinet-level officers are entitled to have their pictures painted at the expense of taxpayers.

The practice isn't new. In 1935, according to the General Services Administration, Harold Ickes, Interior secretary under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, had his own portrait done.

Out of fairness, and so that the walls wouldn't appear to be so bare, Ickes also commissioned portraits for most of the Interior secretaries who preceded him in the office. Instant tradition!

Treasury Secretary Joseph W. Barr also rated a portrait, although his term of office lasted only from Dec. 21, 1968, to Jan. 20, 1969, when President Lyndon B. Johnson left office.

GSA and other independent agencies, in keeping with the noncabinet status, usually go with color photographs of their directors or administrators. While not as imposing, the pictures run about \$10,000 less than the going rate for cabinet officer paintings.

Maybe the Grace Commission on government spending cutbacks could amend its lengthy report to include a money-saving recommendation that Uncle Sam buy or borrow a big camera to use on future cabinet officers as they come and go.

President Jimmy Carter tried to put a stop to the practice of portrait sitting early in his administration by ordering cabinet officers to settle for photographs. But some did and some didn't and by 1979, nobody seemed to be paying any attention to the edict.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14

WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1984

Ex-CIA Chiefs Fault Marine Role

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three former directors of the CIA yesterday faulted the role of U.S. Marines in the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon and suggested that they should be moved from their positions at the Beirut International Airport.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, CIA director under President Jimmy Carter, James R. Schlesinger, who held the post briefly under President Richard M. Nixon, and William E. Colby, CIA director under Nixon and President Gerald R. Ford, echoed the growing restiveness in Congress about the Marines' presence in Lebanon.

"I think the Marines are not on a mission which is a Marine mission at the moment," Colby said in a joint interview with Turner on "Meet the Press" (NBC, WRC). "You should not send superpower forces to a peace-keeping mission. The Marines are not a peace-keeping force."

Colby said that if the United States intends to support the government of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, "We should be doing it with a military aid system and advisers and not with Marines."

Speaking on "This Week With David Brinkley" (ABC, WJLA), Schlesinger said that unless the United States is prepared to change the "balance of forces in the region," then the other option is to withdraw.

"The worst of all policies is probably simply to hang in there, because under those circumstances the cost to the United States will rise. It is probably a blunder to have gotten in," Schlesinger said.

President Reagan is under growing pressure from members of Congress and senior military officials to reexamine the role of U.S. forces in Lebanon and possibly pull them out. Reagan is said to be "adamant" in his opposition to withdrawal, but administration officials, with Congress scheduled to return Jan. 23, are planning to intensify their dis-

cussions about Lebanon this week after Reagan returns from his California vacation.

Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.), a member of the House Armed Services subcommittee that issued a report critical of security measures in effect before the Oct. 23 Beirut terrorist bombing that killed 241 U.S. servicemen, predicted yesterday that Reagan will face "many initiatives" seeking to pressure him to redeploy or withdraw the Marines

when Congress returns. Democratic presidential candidate Walter F. Mondale called over the weekend for an immediate withdrawal of the Marines. Many Democrats on Capitol Hill, including Mavroules and House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.), supported a War Powers Resolution compromise with Reagan allowing the Marines to stay for up to 18 months, but have begun to express doubts about the compromise since the Beirut attack.

Both Turner and Colby suggested that some U.S. presence be maintained in Lebanon. Turner said Reagan could use "an option for pulling out gracefully" by redeploying the Marines to ships offshore, rotating some back to the airport—an option the White House has ruled out in

recent days. Colby suggested that Reagan "step up" U.S. training of the Lebanese army, "so we can show that we're not withdrawing entirely."

Last week, a special Pentagon commission investigating the Beirut bombing criticized U.S. cutbacks in so-called "human" intelligence-gathering capability, as compared to that using technology such as satellites, and presidential spokesman Larry Speakes faulted the Carter administration for these cutbacks.

Turner said the Carter administration had "cut some of the fluff out" of the CIA, for example, but denied that the human intelligence-gathering capability had been weakened.

Yesterday, one member of the commission, former undersecretary of the Navy Robert Murray, said he believes that "there was never a great possibility of courts-martial, at least a successful prosecution, because of the enormous extenuating circumstances."